Negotiating with journalists: Islamic institutions and media scrutiny

Abstract

This article focuses on journalist-source interactions to explore an ethnographic case study of an Islamic centre in London during a period of media scrutiny. The account constitutes part of a doctoral research project analysing Islamic institutions in London through the lenses of civil society and the public sphere, although is here treated largely in isolation. Drawing on my ethnographic findings and interpretive tools from the sociology of media, this article introduces the centre and its everyday life and offers an outline of the period of scrutiny, before addressing four specific themes pertaining the media and the public sphere: the centre as a non-unitary public sphere actor, the significance of public relations resources, the role of centre representatives as journalistic sources, and the politics of meaning in debates over centre responsibility. Through these discussions, it contributes to academic accounts of British Muslims in relation to the media, framings of Muslim agency, strategies and capabilities of ill-resourced media sources, interactions between the media and religious actors, and above all, our understanding of how representatives of Islamic institutions in Muslim-minority contexts engage with the public sphere.
Negotiating with journalists: Islamic institutions and media scrutiny

‘News is a product of transactions between journalists and sources.’¹

What can an episode of media scrutiny tell us about contemporary Islamic institutions in Muslim-minority contexts, and their engagement with the public sphere? This article aims to address these questions by offering an ethnographic case study of an Islamic centre in London. In the summer and autumn of 2014, this centre became the object of media scrutiny, as a series of local Muslims had gone to fight, and sometimes die, for the self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (hereafter: IS), or had sought to assist IS efforts through other means such as financial support. Against the backdrop of a ‘moral panic’ about IS, a number of journalists came to enquire about the centre’s role in this episode and its relationships with these individuals. Their ‘transactions’ with centre representatives, and the contexts of these transactions, form the substance of this article.

The exposition and analysis contributes to a series of academic and popular debates. First, we can situate it within academic studies of British Muslims in relation to the media, which have predominantly focused on the representation of Muslims.² Second, the study engages with two opposing ideological interpretations of Muslims’ agency. The first overdetermines Muslim agency, and frames Muslims, and by extension, Islamic institutions, as perpetual objects of suspicion. Thus, when Muslims guilty of criminality are linked to an Islamic institution, it too becomes part of a narrative of Muslim crime and/or terror, regardless of the meaningfulness of the link. The second
interpretation underdetermines Muslim agency, and frames Muslims as perpetual victims. According to this logic, journalistic coverage of Muslims is destined to present them in a negative light, and Muslims are incapable of being anything other than media objects, unable to shape this coverage. Third, the analysis draws on concepts within the sociology of media to explore the institution’s capabilities and reputational standing, and consequently engages with understandings of journalist-source interactions. And finally, we can place the episode in the context of complex interactions between representatives of religious organisations and journalists, and thus, religious actors’ participation in the public sphere.³

The study emerges from my doctoral fieldwork, which explores Islamic institutions through the lenses of civil society and the public sphere. I observed the issues under discussion while I was undertaking ethnographic research as a volunteer at this institution, and consequently the article mainly draws on my experiences of the centre and my colleagues’ accounts of their interactions with journalists, as well as the reportage that was published and broadcast. As should be obvious, the bounded nature of this fieldwork defines, to some extent, what this article can adequately discuss. For instance, as I was not embedded with the various journalists chasing stories about the individuals concerned, the data does not facilitate extensive theorisation about why these media representatives acted in particular ways. However, acknowledging my positionality as an institutional insider, I undertook informal interviews with journalists unconnected to the episode to help me, together with the relevant literature, place the interactions, strategies and accounts within the context of news reporting culture. I have chosen to keep the institution anonymous.
Introducing an Islamic centre

In a review of the literature on mosques in Western Europe, Marcel Maussen writes, ‘objects such as mosque buildings… do not have a self-evident, clear and constant meaning’. And yet, he suggests, ‘researchers have played a key role in providing interpretations and vocabularies to talk and think about Islam and mosques in Western Europe,’ producing a series of what he calls ‘distinctive sets of meaning’ as a way of understanding them. In turn, these sets of meaning have consequences for ‘the development of research questions and scientific knowledge, and for public and policy discourses about mosques and about Islam in Western Europe.’ Academics, he concludes, should ‘try to reflect critically upon their role in these processes of the production of meaning’.

This article also presents a ‘distinctive set of meaning’ in relation to an Islamic centre, specifically in the form of a public sphere actor. Themes of power, reputation, recognition and responsibility are prevalent, as centre representatives negotiate with journalists about how best to account for the centre’s connections to the aforementioned local Muslims. But, following Maussen’s line, as well as the issue that this episode forms one thread of my ethnographic findings, it would be remiss not to establish some of the contexts in which this ‘set of meaning’ exists. Indeed, as my wider ethnographic research would suggest, there are many other ways of framing the institution, such as in relation to the history of its surrounding area, its participation in narratives of urban renewal, Islamic architecture in Britain, its ethnic and sub-ethnic complexity, everyday experiences of office work, internal institutional power struggles, civil society activism, intra-Islamic positioning, or relationships between religion and the state. Thus, this article aims to offer an appreciation of the wider
in institutional contexts, as well as a series of insights into some of the interactions that constitute part of an Islamic centre’s existence as a public sphere actor.

First, there is the ‘everyday’ life of the institution. The centre serves a religiously and ethnically diverse user community of several thousand, and its general activities include daily prayers, as well as Arabic classes, Islamic lectures and courses, educational and leisure activities serving children and the elderly, private celebrations, interfaith work, and collaboration with the local authorities to host programmes such as health services, training for employment, and English classes. As well as the media, its public sphere interlocutors include worshippers and other centre users, those running partner projects on the premises, partner organisations such as secular charities and Islamic humanitarian organisations, several teams within the local Borough Council, benevolent donors and potential donors, and a wider network of interested Muslim individuals and organisations.

Second, when analysing the individuals’ criminality, I would argue that we need to recognise both dimensions of what Philippe Bourgois, in the context of a discussion about crime, power and marginalisation, calls ‘the theoretical debate over structure versus agency, that is, the relationship between individual responsibility and social structural constraints’. Thus, we have a broader understanding of these individuals’ lives beyond their IS-related criminal culpability if we acknowledge their socio-economic and ethnic standing, particular social and religious networks, family background, educational history, trajectory of employment, and participation in gang culture. In relation to the centre, some occasionally worshipped in its mosque, others had done so in the past, and others were Muslims living in the local area but did not
use the centre. The links, however, stop there. No one representing the centre was involved, and no events supporting IS-related activities were held on its premises, which, due to the centre’s bureaucratic processes that can sometimes be a source of frustration for the centre user group, are a carefully controlled space. Evaluating these factors together, I would argue that this centre is best understood as one of the Islamically identifiable nodes within these individuals’ lives, rather than a focal point for ideological influence in support of IS.

Third, this episode of media scrutiny in relation to IS is not unique. To date, there have been several examples of extensive media interest in instances of individual or small groups of Muslims departing the UK for IS. Case studies would also be possible of, for example, Birmingham, Bradford, Cardiff, Dewsbury, and Portsmouth. Together, these episodes of media scrutiny have contributed to what we might call a ‘moral panic’ about IS, which itself takes place against a background of widespread, if not all-encompassing, media hostility towards Muslims and Islam.7

And fourth, the episode is not the only time that the centre has been subject to media interest. Past coverage includes the building and opening of the centre, its pluralistic aims as a community centre, Ministerial visits, public perceptions of Islam, the role of faith in the voluntary sector, arrests of local Muslims on charges of terrorism, its education work, hosting of humanitarian relief events, and fundraising partnership with a local synagogue. It is also important to point out that not all media interest results in published or broadcast coverage. For example, during my fieldwork a journalist from a tabloid newspaper approached the centre following the sending of a letter by the Communities Secretary to all mosques in Britain. He asked, as he
presumably did of other Islamic institutions, a series of questions that touched on the themes of national pride, intra-Muslim responsibility over extremism, and state-Muslim relations. Colleagues considered that his questions were loaded, and, in view of his newspaper affiliation, any subsequent journalistic analysis would be simplistic. Consequently, they chose not to engage, and no coverage resulted of the centre.

**Outlining a period of scrutiny**

By the phrase ‘media scrutiny’, I refer in this instance to a series of occasions that involved significant, if varied, media interest in the centre over the course of a few months. During this period, the intensity of media interest towards the centre depended on the progress of legal processes at the courts and the gradual emergence of information from abroad, as well as the points at which journalists chose to engage with these events. At its height, some days involved colleagues spending several hours negotiating media interest or working through media-related matters internally, while others entailed no media engagement. And, like other experiences of media interest, coverage did not always result, or did not always include the centre. Journalists might, for example, approach the individuals through other analytical paradigms, such as education, crime, social deprivation, social media or gender.

The material that did appear pertaining to the centre included a TV news report filmed outside it, interviews with a local newspaper, a leading European newspaper and a national news programme, various explicit mentions or allusions in UK broadsheet and tabloid news articles, as well as two Anglophone news websites based outside of the UK, and two polemical pieces on a conservative news and opinion website. There was a wide range of explicit or implicit judgements on the place of the centre in
proceedings, from treating it as the key uniting factor for young Muslims who go to fight for IS, to one of a number of background details in these individuals’ lives.

In addition to their engagement with the media, centre representatives’ actions included issuing public condemnations of IS, such as through sermons or website press releases, undertaking soft measures with the centre user group such as classes for parents about extremist recruitment, and intensifying their work with local and central government authorities. For example, they hosted an event that featured speakers from the police, FCO and Home Office as well as a counter-terrorism specialist, to talk through issues with members of the local community. The goals of all these activities were, as one might expect, to dissuade more individuals from getting involved. Incidentally, the episode did not affect the centre’s relations with local Borough Council representatives, who remained confident in the centre’s work, would draw a distinction between the institution and the problematic segments of its user group, and were more interested in issues such as efficient use of funding, good governance, and how much of the centre’s work focused on Borough residents.

Colleagues’ reactions to the media interest included a genuine interest in engagement, a relaxed attitude towards and/or understanding of media interest in IS-related stories, bemusement at the focus on the centre, disappointment at how the centre or their words were represented, resignation over the ongoing interest, and, on a couple of times, exhaustion. The variation within these reactions relates a range of issues, such as the particular individual, the style of journalistic approach, the content published or broadcast, and the point in time during this period of scrutiny. As a general comment, I felt that colleagues often thought that certain journalists misrecognised what they
understand the role(s) of the centre, and those running the centre, to be. For example, it would seem straightforward to colleagues, but not necessarily journalists, that staff would not know all Muslims in the area, would not know all who had prayed at the centre’s mosque in the past, would be unlikely to know those who only prayed on Fridays and were otherwise uninvolved in the centre’s projects and activities, and that the centre should be open for prayer for all Muslims – provided they abided by the centre’s rules of good conduct – regardless of their political views. Similarly, I felt that there were elements of misrecognition in the other direction: for instance, some colleagues did not seem to grasp immediately certain norms of news reporting culture, such as reducing hour-long interviews to a few sound bites, or how populist understandings of ‘newsworthiness’ related to news reporting objectives.

Finally, it is worth reinforcing that media interest in IS-related stories was not the only matter of importance for those running the centre during this time. Other issues they were managing included staffing capacity and loyalty, financial challenges such as fundraising and chasing debtors, and difficulties related to ongoing building maintenance. To offer a couple of examples that touch on the centre’s engagement with ideas of crime and local youth, one of the centre’s more immediate problems occurred when they had to call out the Metropolitan Police’s Specialist Firearms Command in relation to a scuffle between different groups of young men after prayer one evening. No physical harm resulted, and no press coverage emerged. Coincidentally, just over a fortnight later a newspaper reported the conviction of a local gang who were Muslims, had been arrested some months earlier, and were socially linked to those involved in the first incident. Unlike coverage that linked IS with the centre, this article foregrounded guns, drugs, and gang culture, rather than
religion, ethnicity, and Islamic institutions. Reflecting on these events, a colleague spoke of ‘the cycle of criminality that local boys find hard to escape’, and emphasised the potential of the centre in breaking this cycle and supporting the future development of local children.

The institution as a non-unitary actor

Turning now to focus on specific themes within journalist-source interactions, it is interesting to find that, in its engagement with the media, the centre does not emerge as a unitary actor. First, among senior staff, a diffuse decision-making environment, varying opinions about how best to engage and the nature of the relationship with a journalist who had approached the centre led, at times, to the pursuit of divergent strategies. I include the qualifier ‘at times’ here, since I do not wish to over-emphasise this aspect of internal discord. Indeed, on many issues, such as avoiding engaging with a foreign state-funded news channel due its lack of credibility, senior staff were in agreement. However, when they discussed the possibility of an interview for a feature with the leading European newspaper referenced earlier, those who broadly preferred for the centre to keep a low profile argued against engaging with a non-Anglophone outlet in the context of a public relations exercise whose primary audience was national. Meanwhile, others saw it as an opportunity to offer an authoritative sociology of Muslim crime and outline the limitations of the centre’s capabilities in solving these issues, followed up with the approach, and undertook the interview. Complicating this matter further is how the urgency of some news reporting cycles required more immediate attention, which in turn depended on who might be available to engage at any given moment. In sum, then, it would be impossible to locate a single, coherent media strategy among centre senior staff.
Additionally, not all media strategies and interactions can be attributed to institutional elites. For instance, when a team from a TV news programme visited unannounced one day and attempted to record worshippers leaving the centre after Zuhr prayer, some worshippers challenged the cameraman. An argument followed, and the news team left without usable footage of the centre. By contrast, when another team from a different TV news programme arrived later that day, there were no worshippers around, and the team was able to film their correspondent reporting outside the centre without meaningful challenge. The visits took place a few days before a court was to reach a verdict over three individuals, two of whom had past links to the centre. These links were weak, dated back a number of years, and unknown to senior staff, who were therefore unprepared for any media interest.

Further, after one journalist wrote an unfavourable article about the centre in a London newspaper, another journalist, who had personal experience of the centre as an occasional worshipper, used their position as a columnist for a popular media blog to critique this account. This journalist then brought their article to the attention of centre staff by leaving a message through the online contact form, and asked them to repost it on the website and circulate widely, which they did. The article was popular with colleagues, who were also quick to note that it presented the capabilities of the centre in a more positive light than they might offer themselves.

Public relations resources

The second theme I wish to raise relates to the centre’s strengths as a public sphere actor. Philip Schlesinger’s discussion on evaluating source ‘resources’ is helpful here,
and offers a model for addressing this question on the institutional level. It acknowledges three areas: ‘the extent to which any given source is institutionalized’, the ‘financial base available to a given actor’, and ‘cultural capital in the shape of legitimacy, authoritativeness, respectability and the contacts which these bring’. 

Following Schlesinger’s methodology, the centre emerges as, to borrow Edie Goldenberg’s phrase, a ‘resource poor’ institution in the field of actors seeking to contribute to public discussions about Muslims and Islam. Unlike, for instance, a government department or counter-terrorism think-tank, the centre does not have a meaningful long-term presence as a media source. Additionally, it has a limited support base: unlike well-known public institutions with wide-reaching support, comparatively few people know of the centre. Financially, it could not support a public relations and engagement team, nor have a budget for occasional professional lobbyists. And compared to a resource rich organisation such as a successful multinational, it lacks a strong security presence, something significant for preventing journalists’ easy access or even, as came up in discussion following a journalist’s easy access, filmed ‘mosque invasions’ by far-right anti-Muslim groups. Further, if we take as axiomatic that Islamic institutions in Britain have reputational problems, for Schlesinger the centre will face the problem of a deficit of ‘cultural capital’: a ‘credibility factor [that] plainly links in directly to the perception of sources within the media the rules of thumb for handling them’. An illustrative example here is how colleagues were sometimes nervous about the possibility of media interactions where a centre representative might not have ‘enough’ of an English-sounding accent.
While Schlesinger’s model is a helpful one, its level of generality means that, of course, it cannot explain the outcomes of all interactions between journalist and institutional representative. Indeed, while some instances affirmed the thesis of a deficit of ‘cultural capital’, others ran counter to it. Additionally, as David Miller and Kevin Williams argue, resource poor institutions can improve their public standing, in spite of their comparative deficits, through an ability to ‘conform to the practices and routines of… the nature of media production which determines the way in which information is provided’, which ‘can be useful in notching up cultural capital with the media’.  

This description echoes what I thought were the most successful aspects of centre representatives’ engagement with journalists. In particular, a few colleagues who had prior media experience were able to work for the centre’s reputational benefit by, for example, insisting on off-record briefings where possible.

Interestingly, centre representatives’ interest in developing their public relations resources was limited. When I asked a colleague how the centre might develop a formal media strategy if financial support was available, he disagreed with the premise of the question. In spite of the reputational challenges Islamic institutions can face, the centre should, he argued, prioritise serving a local community above the idea of being a public sphere actor, regardless of whatever financial support from a donor might be available. Within the context of Islamic institutions, then, the question of public relations strategy cannot be reduced to a question of game theory.

Centre representatives: media sources

A further way of exploring the centre’s strengths as a public sphere actor is to focus on centre representatives in their roles as media sources, which raises questions of
agency in the production of journalism. Following theorists such as Richard Ericson et al. as well as Miller and Williams, ‘control’ of any story depends on a number of variables, including access, choice of sources, perceived source authority, source strategies, alliance and conflict between sources or even within source and media organisations, journalists’ personal relationships, and ideological conformity between journalists and their sources. Applying these insights to this case study, first it is important to note that the most significant restrictions to centre representatives’ potential contributions, or attempts at control, occurred when either journalists chose not to offer them the opportunity to become sources, or individual journalists’ residual suspicions about Islamic institutions shaped how the centre featured within their accounts, regardless of what sources had said.

Nevertheless, there were many opportunities where centre representatives, in their roles as journalistic sources, were able to contribute to the processes behind media coverage of the centre, and thus, media coverage of Islam and Muslims. For example, one of the main strategies of senior staff, particularly at the beginning of the media interest, was to seek to keep the centre’s name out of the press. This logic relates to protecting the centre’s reputation: it is undesirable to have Google search results of the centre that entail articles connecting it with themes of extremism, terrorism and violence. As a colleague suggested, ‘The reputation we’ve built up through all of the work we’ve done, and the council and our other partners have done, in developing a centre that properly serves the community… [can get] wiped out, just like that.’ Accordingly, they would make the case to enquiring journalists that the centre was not a significant factor in the individuals’ lives, and presenting it as such would damage its public standing. Although not all journalists agreed and this strategy
ultimately failed, it is worth noting that there were a number who did agree with their argument. Consequently, these journalists either referred to the centre by the local area and framed it as a background detail within their accounts, or used general information gathered from centre representatives but omitted the centre from their accounts.

These findings are also of methodological significance for the study of British Muslims in relation to the media. It demonstrates how an ethnographically informed approach addresses both our understanding of Muslim agency through Muslims’ roles as journalistic sources as well as objects of media coverage, and the heterogeneity of journalists’ activities in covering Islam and Muslims. By contrast, academic approaches that focus on representation can neither take into account Muslims’ perspectives during and regarding media production processes, nor measure absences of representation, such as here in the form of journalists who decide against including an Islamic institution in their accounts for reasons of misrepresentation.

Institutional responsibility and the politics of knowledge

The final theme I wish to raise is the question of institutional responsibility, which emerged as a central theme in interactions between journalists and centre representatives. Specifically, to what extent should this centre be responsible for the actions of local Muslims, including those with whom it had a limited relationship?

Earlier in this article, I mentioned some of the centre’s activities that constitute preventative work against crime and extremism. But how can we measure an institution’s success or failure here? Some journalists’ approaches implied the centre
could better manage its responsibilities in shaping local Muslims to be good citizens. One suggested that, despite the centre’s work, it still had a communication problem in reaching local youth in view of those individuals that had joined or supported IS. Others questioned whether the centre was fully aware of, and able to control, all of the conversations and activities of worshippers on its premises. The underlying premise here was that when Muslims would visit the centre in large numbers, such as for Friday prayers, some individuals would be likely to radicalise other attendees unless they were properly supervised by institutional elites. While the second approach misrecognises, in my opinion, both the everyday culture of the centre and the decision-making abilities of individual attendees, the former touches on an often-discussed matter of concern within the centre, namely how best to reach and shape the minds of the youth. During my fieldwork, various centre stakeholders approached this problem through a range of lenses, including sport, social life, volunteering, employment, and Islamic studies, as well as crime.

And yet, centre representatives and project leaders had more modest expectations of what they might be able to achieve among local youth. Constraining issues included their limited resources, competing models for ethical behaviour among young Muslims, and a perceived trend of individualisation of Islamic authority, something that colleagues sometimes termed ‘Sheikh Google’. An illustrative example of the different perspectives occurred when, following an arrest of local Muslims not connected to the centre, a radio journalist introduced an Islamic scholar based at the centre as ‘want[ing] his flock to stay put’. Listening with a colleague, this description jarred. In addition to the Christian-centric metaphor, senior staff’s perspectives on engaging with the centre user group would not include the phrase ‘staying put’, or
similar. Simply, their understandings of users’ agency, which were not just limited to issues of extremism, but also everyday questions such as how the centre should be run, whom it should prioritise, and why, were more complex.

Ultimately, there is no clearly defined idea of the extent of the institution’s responsibility in relation to its local Muslims, or what executing this responsibility properly should look like. But, following Ericson et al., these discussions over responsibility would have a wider significance. The interactions functioned as an opportunity for both journalists and centre representatives to project their understandings of what Islamic institutions can, or should, do for their local constituency. This kind of debate, which interrogates normative social expectations regarding public understandings of Islamic institutions, is not a neutral one, and constitutes part of ‘the politics of knowledge’ inherent in news reporting culture.\(^\text{12}\)

Closing comments

To conclude, this article has discussed what an ethnographically rooted exploration of an episode of media scrutiny can tell us about contemporary Islamic institutions in Muslim-minority contexts, and their engagement with the public sphere. I have sought to offer both relevant context for the institution and the episode, as well as an analysis of more specific themes relating to the media and the public sphere.

Further analyses of this data are of course possible, such as the ongoing consequences of the episode, the comparative subject-specific expertise of the different journalists covering stories of the individuals, and a more extended discourse analysis of the articles and broadcasts that resulted from these interactions. Further still, one could
explore the extent to which this episode of media scrutiny relates specifically to Islamic institutions and Muslims in Muslim-minority contexts such as Britain, as opposed to a study of any small, comparatively poorly resourced organisation working in a publically problematic area, a question that lends itself to discussions of de-Islamising studies of Muslims.¹³

In bringing the discussion to a close, I would like to stress a few points that I feel stand out in the context of academic understandings of contemporary Islamic institutions and their engagement with the public sphere. First, although the centre’s links to the individuals fighting or supporting IS were limited, its representatives experienced various source and resource-related difficulties during the period of media scrutiny. However, media engagement and coverage were not homogeneous: some journalists had more sympathetic readings of the very same situation than others, to the extent that they left the centre our of their accounts altogether. This heterogeneity, as we have seen, cannot always be accommodated by methodologies within the study of Muslims and the western media that focus on representation. Finally, an ethnographically informed approach has also assisted in navigating between different ideological interpretations of Muslims’ agency, in both showing the limitations of accounts of causal links between individuals and institutions, and acknowledging the opportunities of journalistic sources to shape stories that ultimately represent them.


7 Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (London: Routledge, 2002), 1. ‘Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.’


11 Ericson et al., *Negotiating Control*, Chapter 1, and Miller and Williams, “Sourcing AIDS News”.

12 Ericson et al., *Negotiating Control*, 377.